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When harsh cuts were introduced in the Swedish welfare state in an agreement between the 
centre-right government and the opposition Social Democrats in 1992, there were astonishingly 
few disagreements between the political parties as to which social groups should carry the bur-
dens of the cuts. The conventional wisdom on welfare state retrenchment would lead us to expect 
a clash of interests, especially considering the strength of interest groups in Sweden and the dif-
ferent constituencies of the five parties included in the agreement. This paper explains why that 
did not happen. It argues that the role that key officials played in shaping the 1992 retrenchment 
agreement in Sweden was decisive in averting potential political conflicts. In a crisis, politicians 
depend on advice from officials as politicians need complex information, often under pressure of 
time. This paper argues that key state officials, through their advice, defined both the character of 
the crisis and the range of possible solutions. As the number of options was restricted, key offi-
cials were able to define what cuts were reasonable. Within this framework, politicians looked for 
practical solutions and, to a large extent, disregarded conflicts of interest. This paper also sug-
gests that the content of such advice depends on what is called the loyalty of key officials, which 
depends on the terms of their employment.  
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When harsh cuts were introduced in the Swedish welfare state in an agreement 
between the center-right government and the opposition Social Democrats – the so-
called “first crisis-package” in September 1992 – there were astonishingly few disagree-
ments among the political parties as to which social groups should carry the burdens of 
the cuts. Moreover, in contrast with the usual practice, interest groups were largely ex-
cluded from the process. The conventional wisdom on welfare state retrenchment would 
lead us to expect a clash of interests, especially considering the strength of interest 
groups in Sweden and the different constituencies of the five parties included in the 
agreement (Korpi & Palme 2003; Pierson 1996, 2001; Stephens, Huber & Ray 1999). How 
can we explain why they could nevertheless reach this agreement? 
 
The main approaches in the literature on welfare state retrenchment do not pro-
vide much help toward answering the question. Scholars following Paul Pierson’s (1994) 
influential assessment have drawn attention to the limited range of welfare cutbacks and 
claimed that social policy frameworks, although under pressure, remain secure in basi-
cally all mature welfare states. The lack of cutbacks is explained largely by the unpopu-
larity of welfare retrenchment among voters and the influence of new interest groups 
such as pensioners, created by the welfare state itself (Esping-Andersen 1999; Green-
Pedersen & Havland 2002; Lindbom 2001; Pierson 1994, 1996, 2001; Taylor-Gooby 2002). 
Others have challenged this analysis often using the power-resource approach asso-
ciated with explanations of welfare state expansion. From this perspective, welfare state 
cuts are largely explained by the power distribution among class-based actors and ex-
pressed in partisan politics (Allan & Scruggs 2004; Anderson 2001; Clayton & Pontusson 
1998; Korpi & Palme 2003; Timonen 2003).  
 
Diverse as these approaches are, they have one assumption in common, and it is 
this assumption that is of interest in this study. Both analyze the political process of wel-
fare retrenchment as largely defined by the influence of powerful interest groups, be 
they new groups of welfare clients or old class-based groups. Following either of these 
approaches one would expect heavy interest group influence. The political parties 
should act according to the interest of the strongest interest group in their respective 
constituencies, considering their power-resources and their association with the parties. 
As already noted the Swedish case suggests that this does not present the full picture. 
However, the assumption that interest groups are the decisive factor influencing the out-
comes of retrenchment initiatives evidently does not hold in the case of Sweden in the 
early 1990s. 
 
This article argues that the role that key officials – that is, centrally placed civil 
servants in the Government Offices or agencies – played in shaping the 1992 retrench-
ment agreement in Sweden was decisive in averting potential political conflicts. This ar-
gument builds on Hugh Heclo’s notion that “politics finds its sources not only in power 
but also in uncertainty” (Heclo 1974, 305). In a crisis, politicians depend on advice from 
officials as politicians need complex information, often under pressure of time. I argue 
that key state officials, through their advice, defined both the character of the crisis and 
the range of possible solutions. As the number of options was restricted, key officials 
were able to define what cuts were reasonable. Within this framework, politicians 
looked for practical solutions and, to a large extent, disregarded conflicts of interest. 
Without the advice from the key officials, or with other advice, both the welfare cuts and   3
the process itself would probably have been different. Therefore, the Swedish case sug-
gests that civil servants may play a more important role in determining the extent and 
character of cuts in mature welfare states then has been recognized. 
 
This paper also suggests that the content of such advice depends on what I call 
the loyalty of key officials. Roughly stated, officials can be loyal either to the state or to 
the government, depending on the terms of their employment. In some countries key 
state officials depend on the government for their position; the United Kingdom is one 
such example. In other countries they do not; Sweden falls into this category. In coun-
tries where state officials depend upon the government, they tend to think like politi-
cians, calculating political gains and losses, therefore including interest considerations in 
their advice. In such countries key official advice would not have the disarming effect on 
political conflict observed in Sweden. However, in countries where key officials depend 
upon the state, political conflicts of interest are disregarded in their advice, and, instead, 
the official’s advice is biased by their position in the state apparatus. This is what hap-
pened in Sweden. 
 
Interests, Time, and Influential Officials 
 
Two conclusions may be drawn from the ongoing debates on welfare retrench-
ment. On the one hand, until now, welfare retrenchment has not brought about any 
shifts from one welfare regime to another in the mature welfare states due to welfare re-
trenchment (Esping-Andersen 1999; Huber & Stephens 2001; Pierson 1996, 2001; Taylor-
Gooby 2002). The configuration of welfare regimes seems stable, although some analyses 
suggest a diminishing role of the welfare state, as social policies do not always cope with 
changes involving new social risks (Hacker 2004; Taylor-Gooby 2004). On the other 
hand, conclusions concerning stability of welfare state regimes have led to an underesti-
mation of welfare state cuts actually taking place in Oceania, North America and West-
ern Europe. Recent studies show that major cuts have been made in several countries 
during the 1980s and 1990s, among them Sweden (Allan & Scruggs 2004; Clayton & Pon-
tusson 1998; Korpi & Palme 2003). It is the variation in welfare cutbacks that this paper 
seeks to explore. 
 
As Jacob S. Hacker has noted, too much attention has been paid to what has not 
happened to the welfare state and too little to what actually has happened (Hacker 2005). 
To some extent, this is due to the tendency in much of the existing literature to define 
welfare state retrenchment so as to exclude changes that have not caused major institu-
tional reform. In such studies welfare state retrenchment is seen to occur only if the wel-
fare state no longer remains in the same welfare state regime after the cuts (Lindbom 
2001). I instead define retrenchment as any cutbacks in the welfare state, following the 
definition of welfare state retrenchment as suggested in the power resources tradition 
(Green-Pedersen 2004). There the welfare state is seen as a provider of social rights (Kor-
pi & Palme 2003). Welfare state retrenchment is consequently defined as changes in 
these social rights that make them less attractive or generous (Green-Pedersen 2004). 
This more inclusive definition is necessary in order to take real changes into account. 
 
The paper shows how cuts in the Swedish welfare state in the 1990s cannot be 
explained without taking into account factors typically neglected in studies of the politi-  4
cal output of retrenchment processes in mature welfare states. The term output refers to 
the intended policy result, and should be distinguished from the actual result (outcome). 
In particular, I want to show how taking such factors into account helps explain varia-
tions in how the burden of retrenchment is distributed among social groups. 
 
There are several suggestions in existing theory that could – and to a large extent 
also do – explain this variation but, as noted earlier, the Swedish case suggests that these 
explanations do not present the whole story. The basic assumption in the existing litera-
ture, although scholars disagree on a lot of issues, is that the strongest interest groups 
can control retrenchment and even resist it if it serves their interests. Interests can indeed 
a lot in some cases. However, I argue, there are limits to interest-based explanations, at 
least when political decision makers become dependent on bureaucratic advice when an 
economic crisis leaves them with little time and a need for complex information. 
 
In what can be called the New Politics perspective, welfare state retrenchment (or 
lack thereof) is explained by a framework resting on two pillars (Pierson 1994, 1996, 
2001). The first is the unpopularity of retrenchment reforms. As noted by New Politics 
scholars, the welfare state enjoys strong support among voters in almost all Western de-
mocracies, support that is both broad and intense. It is broad because expanding the 
welfare state has involved a large proportion of the electorate either as employees or as 
clients. In 1995, as Pierson shows, 57 percent of the electorate in Sweden, 51 percent in 
Germany and 32 percent in the United States belonged to either or both of those two 
categories (Pierson 2001, 413). 
 
The intensity of the support stems from two sources. To start with, interests in 
maintaining the welfare state are concentrated. Welfare clients are reasonably well de-
fined groups, such as pensioners, the long-term sick and the unemployed, with strong 
common interests in defending the source of income. This stands in sharp contrast to 
supporters of welfare retrenchment, who are a diffuse group with an ill-defined goal. 
Gains from welfare retrenchment are, as these scholars note, uncertain and widespread. 
The intensity also stems from the fact that those opposing welfare cuts fight for already 
existing benefits, while supporters of retrenchment do not. New Politics scholars point 
to psychological and electoral research showing that voters react differently to losses 
and gains, as they react more intensely to negative rather than positive risks (Pierson 
1996). 
 
This broad and intense support makes it hazardous for politicians to advocate 
welfare retrenchment, as voters probably will punish them, and strong interest groups 
will mobilize against it. This, in the New Politics view, makes the politics of welfare re-
trenchment something very different from the politics of welfare expansion, as welfare 
expansion was widely popular (Pierson 1996). 
 
There are some limitations to this argument, however. As Korpi & Palme (2003) 
have noted, welfare expansion was not an altogether popular process, considering that 
reforms had to be paid for by increased taxes. Raising levels of taxation was never popu-
lar, and therefore also a hazardous game for politicians to play. The voters faced a trade-
off between welfare expansion and taxation, and this conflict was solved in elections 
where different parties held different standpoints regarding this trade-off. I see no rea-  5
son, from the outset, to rule out the possibility that the same process would take place 
with welfare retrenchments. It is clear that the support for the welfare state is strong in 
several countries (Svallfors 1997). But, without considering other dimensions of public 
opinion – such as support for budget cuts in times of economic crisis – it does not neces-
sarily lead to the conclusion that all parties will avoid advocating welfare retrenchment 
(e.g. Gilljam 1988). 
 
The second pillar of the New Politics framework is what is called institutional 
stickiness. Here two different factors both reinforce the electoral obstacles spelled out 
above. 
 
The first factor is the impact of veto points in the political system. The basic argu-
ment is that the less concentrated political power is – the more veto points there are – the 
harder it is to hold a coalition of retrenchment agents together (Pierson 2001). But there 
is also another, contradictory way that veto points work. As a lack of veto points concen-
trates accountability in the same way that it concentrates power, it also increases the 
risks attached to unpopular political decisions (Pierson & Weaver 1993; cf. Bonoli 2001). 
 
The second factor is the well-known feedback process that has been called “path 
dependency” (Pierson 2000). Roughly, this means that political courses are often hard to 
change once in place, because of large set-up costs – investments that will be lost if an-
other way is chosen – and because of actor adaptations to previous arrangements. It has 
been suggested that this to a large extent is the case in welfare politics (Pierson 2001). 
 
The New Politics standpoint suggests that retrenchment is rare, but it also im-
plies that any variation should be explained by four different factors. The first consists of 
voters’ preferences, where high public support for the welfare state is expected to block 
retrenchment. In this case, when we are trying to explain why particular groups are tar-
geted, we should expect political parties to advocate cuts that affect their voter base as 
little as possible. 
 
Second, there is the influence from new interest groups, where a high intensity in 
support for the welfare state also blocks retrenchment. In this case we should expect cuts 
to be greatest where the intensity of support is lowest, that is, where interest groups are 
poorly organized. The long-term sick might, for example, be one such case, while pen-
sioners might be an example of the opposite. 
 
Third, there are the effects of veto points, where a large number of veto points 
halts retrenchment. This suggestion has no clear implication about which groups one 
should expect to be targeted with cuts. 
 
The fourth is path dependency, where sunk costs and actor adaptation to the ex-
isting welfare system also block retrenchment. In line with this insight, one should ex-
pect to see cuts that do not lead to new investments, and where actors need to change 
their behavior as little as possible. 
 
In this study, through which I am trying to understand why certain groups are 
targeted with cuts the first two explanations are of most interest. According to the New 
Politics logic, the political parties should aim welfare cuts at voter groups that are not   6
easily mobilized, or that are not in the voter base of the party. The political parties 
should also avoid cuts in areas where there are strong organized interests. 
 
As already noted, advocates of New Politics predict that the four hypotheses 
above will very rarely – if ever – speak in favor of welfare retrenchment. This leaves 
politicians only one option: “blame avoidance” (Pierson 1996, 145). Politicians will use 
techniques to avoid being punished by voters. These strategies seek either to avoid re-
sponsibility by lowering the visibility of reforms or to divide their opponents by playing 
them off against each other or compensating them in some way (Pierson 1996). This 
gives us a fifth suggestion. This says something about how politicians should be ex-
pected to act while carrying out the welfare cuts. It means that politicians will try to 
avoid being held accountable for welfare retrenchment. Political actors should therefore 
be expected to try to hide which groups are targeted, buy support from the most impor-
tant groups, sacrificing less important groups, and play different groups against each 
other. 
 
In what might be called the Class Politics perspective, welfare retrenchment is 
seen as a distributive conflict largely determined by the allocation of power resources 
among class-related interest groups. In that process partisan politics and welfare institu-
tions are very significant: partisan politics, as it channels class interests; and welfare in-
stitutions, as they structure both interests and resources (Korpi & Palme 2003). 
 
Power resources are the “capabilities of actors to reward or to punish other ac-
tors” (Korpi & Palme 2003, 427). The basic argument is that different socioeconomic 
classes are dependent on different power resources and therefore prefer distributional 
conflicts to be solved either by the logic of markets or politics. Actors relying on econo-
mic assets, primarily capital, will prefer solutions based on market logic, while actors 
relying on the power of numbers, primarily labor, will prefer solutions based on political 
logic. It is argued that welfare states can be seen as outcomes of conflicts among class ac-
tors relying on these different resources (Korpi & Palme 2003). 
 
This conflict is manifested in partisan politics because of a linkage between class 
and party. This means that the variation in retrenchment should be explained by the dis-
tribution of power among class and party actors. When parties to the right and interest 
groups associated with them are strong there should be more welfare retrenchment than 
when the left is strong and there are strong unions. What is of greater importance in this 
study, one should also expect parties to fight for the rights of the class associated with 
them, and policy output to be influenced by the strength of interest groups. The sugges-
tion is that class-based interest groups will, through partisan politics, affect retrench-
ment according to their interests. Consequently, political parties should be expected to 
advocate cuts on groups not linked with them. 
 
It is important to note both the differences and the commonalities of the two per-
spectives. One common assumption is one of rationality and the importance of group 
interests. Both perspectives are theories of rational agents and to a large extent both rely 
on interest-based explanations. Their main disagreement concerns which interest groups 
one should look to; “new” client-based or “old” class-based groups.    7
The interest group influence on a welfare retrenchment process might, however, 
be limited in many ways. In his important study of social policy in Britain and Sweden, 
Hugh Heclo (1974) points to the limits of interest-based explanations and stresses the im-
portance of learning. “Governments not only ‘power’ (or whatever the verb form of that 
approach might be); they also puzzle,” Heclo concludes (Heclo 1974, 305). In his view, 
even powerful actors do not always know what they want, and learning this is as impor-
tant as struggling over different alternatives. Actors learn what they want in two ways: 
from experience and from advice. This gives key civil servants a very important role, as 
they have both experience of policy performance, and analytic capacity enough to sug-
gest solutions to the problem at hand. This gives them power to define what should be 
done. Their position caused Heclo to conclude that “bureaucracies of Britain and Swe-
den loom predominant in the policies studied” (Heclo 1974, 301).  
 
As Patrik Marier (2005) has recently pointed out, bureaucratic influence is ig-
nored in the New Politics perspective, and this is also true for the Class Politics perspec-
tive (Rothstein 1996). In both schools, state officials are, without further consideration, 
seen as loyal to the political majority and willing to support the government with expert 
advice, this even though it is well known that the bureaucracy can have its own agenda 
(Peters 1995). 
 
Following Heclo, I propose that the retrenchment agenda is influenced by advice 
from key officials. It is probably even more so in periods of welfare state retrenchment 
then it was in periods of welfare state expansion. After all, the welfare systems have 
grown more complex over time, making the need for expert advice even more crucial. 
Information and analytic capacity are, as Heclo remarks, what give key officials their 
central role (Heclo 1974). 
 
If this is accepted as a valid point, it is important to investigate if there is any sys-
tematic difference to what kind of advice key officials give politicians. I believe that we 
should expect that. In their analysis of state responses to the Great Depression, Margaret 
Weir and Theda Skocpol (1985) make an important claim. Appointed officials (as well as 
politicians) have organizational and career interests of their own, and they will generally 
not act in ways that could harm these interests. When acting, they will consider the state 
structure in which they are located. Their role in the state apparatus will affect their in-
terests, but it will also affect their advice in another way. “If a given state structure pro-
vides no existing, or readily foreseeable, ‘policy instruments’ for implementing a given 
line of action, government officials are not likely to pursue it,” as Weir and Skocpol put 
it (Weir & Skocpol 1985, 118). In the case of welfare retrenchment this means two differ-
ent things. First, regarding policy advice, we should expect it to have a bias toward 
maintaining the existing policy structure. Second, and in this case maybe more impor-
tant, the advice from key officials should be expected to be influenced by the way that 
key officials interpret their role within the state structure. 
 
It is important to be aware of the way that we should expect bureaucrats to influ-
ence political decisions. It is not by pushing for specific decisions in any direct way. 
They have neither the capacity nor the legitimacy to do so. Instead, this is done through 
their influence over the agenda. Here, their role is more limiting then creative. By mak-  8
ing some suggestions instead of others, the range of political decisions available for poli-
ticians is restricted. This makes their role reactive, but not less important. 
 
Given the expectation that officials’ advice will reflect their interests, and their in-
terests will be affected by their role in the state apparatus, as Weir and Skocpol argue, 
how will their role in the state apparatus enter into their perception of their interests? 
The answer that I suggest is that it will be largely determined by whether their role is de-
fined in relation to the government or the state – in other words, to which of these they 
feel they owe their loyalty. Loyalty to the government means that a political logic will in-
fluence a state official’s advice. He or she will, like politicians, think about the outcome 
of the next election and thereby consider the attitudes of voters and the impact of impor-
tant interest groups. In such cases, interest-based explanations put forward by New Poli-
tics and Class Politics scholars will probably be more valid. Loyalties to the state, on the 
other hand, imply that state officials do not think like politicians. Instead their advice is 
influenced by the structure of the system, and their role within it. State officials in this 
position think and act to keep the system as functional as possible from their point of 
view. It is important to note that key officials in different positions can hold quite differ-
ent points of view. For key officials at the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs this 
might mean keeping the welfare system intact, even when cutbacks are necessary. Cuts 
will in such a case be made according to the already existing welfare state structure, for 
example the universalistic structure of the Swedish case. All key officials will, however, 
not view the welfare system as the defining feature for their advice. Officials at the Cen-
tral bank will, for example, worry much more about the bank’s objectives when they 
give advice. 
 
Loyalty of key officials differs systematically among nations. The reason is that 
state officials are employed on very different conditions in mature welfare states. In 
countries like the United Kingdom and the United States, key state officials are depend-
ent on the government for their position (Sausman & Locke 2004; Peters 2004); in other 
countries, such as Sweden, Denmark and Germany, they are not (Grönnegård 
Christensen 2004; Pierre 2004; Schröter 2004). In the first cases, key officials should there-
fore be more loyal to the government while, in the latter case, they should be more loyal 
to the state. This may help explain the differences in retrenchment among countries, 
where the U.K., for example, is the western country where the most far-reaching welfare 
cuts have been carried out, while more limited cut-backs have been made in Sweden. 
However, one could also make sense of the Swedish case alone. Bureaucratic support for 
the existing system seems to have limited the range of choices available for the political 
parties and has therefore blocked out a lot of interest conflicts.  
 
Taking the bureaucracy into consideration is especially important in welfare re-
trenchment, as it is often characterized by the need for complex information and some-
times also by lack of time. It is probably uncontroversial to claim that mature welfare 
states are complex, but to assert that welfare state retrenchment is characterized by lack 
of time needs some additional support. In quantitative comparative studies scholars 
have found effects of negative fiscal balance and high unemployment levels. How large 
these effects are is in dispute, but it seems to be clear that they have some effects (Allan 
& Scruggs 2004; Huber & Stephens 2001; Korpi & Palme 2003). This can be interpreted as 
a crisis-effect. In line with this, I argue that a crisis in itself provides time constraints and   9
therefore that lack of time and retrenchment are related in some way. Exactly how com-
mon time and information constraints are, are empirical questions and go beyond the 
scope of this article. The theoretical argument, however, is that in cases with a lack of 
time and need for complex information, politicians are even more then otherwise depen-
dent upon central state officials for information and recommendations. One should 
therefore expect the loyalty of key officials to influence their advice under all circum-
stances, but their advice will be more influential if the politicians lack either the time, the 
capacity or both to come up with policies of their own. Time and the need for complex 
information are considered to be “intervening variables” in this approach. 
 
Sweden was such a case: cuts and tax increases of about 40 billion SEK were 
agreed to after just four days of negotiations between the center-right government and 
the social democratic opposition (Teorell 1998). Such time pressure probably reinforces 
the influence of key officials, as politicians operating under such circumstances have to 
work with already existing propositions. When there is a lack of time, you simply have 
to work with what you have. 
 
Summing up, as state officials in some countries are more loyal to the state than 
to the government, they might be biased by their own role in the system, not calculating 
political gains and losses, and this affects the political output of the retrenchment pro-
cess. 
 
In total, I have put forward seven different circumstances that would need to be 
explored for a full explanation, and if we consider the two versions of interest-group in-
fluence as one circumstance, we have six. I will, however, consider only four of them. 
 
As it has no clear implication for the question that I am trying to answer, I will 
not test the veto point hypothesis, since there were very few veto points in Sweden in 
the 1990s. This has two consequences. First, this should make it easier to push through a 
retrenchment agenda for a coalition of retrenchment agents then otherwise would have 
been the case. Second, this limits the possibilities for blame avoidance, as it concentrates 
accountability on the government and its allies.  
 
I will instead focus on the techniques suggested by the blame-avoidance hy-
pothesis. According to that, how the political process unfolds should be motivated by a 
desire among politicians not to be held responsible for retrenchment. 
 
I will also explore the impact of the voter hypothesis on the Swedish case. Re-
garding the question I am trying to answer, its prediction should be fairly clear: poli-
ticians should be concerned with the strong support for the welfare state among voters 
and this should restrict the retrenchment. 
 
In addition, I will investigate the impact of interest groups in the Swedish case. 
Here I am collapsing the two different interest group arguments put forward by advo-
cates of New Politics and Class Politics. As previously noted, there is a common assump-
tion that interest groups will be influential, but different opinions as to which groups are 
important, new or old. It is the common assumption that is investigated here, but I will 
not try to evaluate which kind of interest group is the most influential, if any. For this   10
assumption to be correct strong interest groups should be of importance and steer the 
retrenchment process in favor of their interest.  
 
Finally, I will investigate the bureaucracy hypothesis, which suggests that key of-
ficials influence the retrenchment process by limiting the options available to politicians. 
This should be done in a manner consistent with the key official’s interest, given her or 
his position in the state structure. 
 
Sweden in the 1990s 
 
I use what Peter Hall has called a systematic process analysis to investigate the 
Swedish case. One advantage of this method is that it reveals actual steps taken in the 
political process, and thereby shows real actors in their context. If, by using this ap-
proach, one cannot trace the influence of certain actors anticipated to have had power 
over the decisions made, it is probably not there. The research strategy is to find as many 
observations about the process as possible, guided by theoretical suggestions, and to try 
to make a judgment about which explanation best specifies the process. This makes it 
possible to compare the predictions made in the competing theories discussed above, 
and to evaluate their strength when explaining this case. The analysis will therefore be 
more focused on the process leading up to the political decisions of making welfare cuts 
than on the cuts themselves. I will also consider counterfactual scenarios (Hall 2003). 
 
One disadvantage with this approach is the limitation of knowing how typical 
the Swedish case is. Here it is important to note some characteristics of the case. There 
are three rather distinct periods of Swedish welfare state cuts in the 1990s. The first is the 
period of the Stop-package, 1990-1991. This package was announced by the Social Democ-
ratic government in 1990, and implemented in 1991 in cooperation with the Liberal Par-
ty, before the election. The second is the period of the Crisis packages, unfolding from 
1991 to 1994. The first two crisis packages were agreed on by the center-right govern-
ment and the social democratic opposition 1992 and implemented before the election of 
1994. But throughout this period, other retrenchment packages, supported only by the 
center-right government, were also introduced, and carried through Parliament with the 
support of shifting majorities. The third period covers the Budget reconstruction program, 
from 1994 to 1998. The Social Democratic Party was reelected in 1994 on a platform in-
cluding measures such as benefit cuts and tax increases to handle the increasing budget 
deficit. This program was carried out by the Social Democrats, and supported by the Left 
Party (1994-1995) and the Center Party (1995-1998) (Jochem 2003; Lindvall 2004; Palme & 
Wennemo 1998; Ploug 1999). 
 
In this study, I will deal with the period of Crisis packages (1991-1994), paying 
special attention to the political process leading up to the first two packages, played out 
in the autumn of 1992. 
 
I selected this case for three reasons. First, Sweden has a setting of strong and 
well-organized interest groups, both “new” groups, like pensioners’ organizations, and 
“old” groups, like trade unions (Timonen 2003). And, although corporatist institutions in 
Sweden declined during the 1990s, interest organizations are still strong and important 
(Jochem 2003; Svensson & Öberg 2002). This makes Sweden an easy case for the interest   11
group approach, and therefore a hard case for any challenging theory. Second, the lack 
of veto points and the severe economic crisis in Sweden in the 1990s makes it probable 
that serious welfare cuts would be made and that a range of retrenchment options 
would be considered. Third, in the period of Crisis packages (1991-1994) there is a varia-
tion in time pressure on political actors that, at least to some extent, makes it possible to 
evaluate the effect of time pressure. In the autumn of 1992, there was a currency crisis 
that made it necessary to act with great speed. After the floating of the krona in Novem-
ber 1992, much of the time pressure was taken away; this is discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
The empirical analysis draws on official documents, secondary sources, archives, 
and interviews with policymakers and state officials. One archive is specially worth 
mentioning. After her death, the former Minister for Finance (1991-1994) Anne Wibble 
left an archive of documents and correspondence from her years as an active politician 
at the National Archives of Sweden (Riksarkivet). The interviews were conducted with 
centrally placed actors in the retrenchment process of the early 1990s, and include both 




Early 1990s Sweden experienced a severe economic crisis. The crisis led to the 
emergence of mass unemployment, not seen in Sweden since the Great Depression. Un-
employment rose from only 1.6 per cent in 1990 to its postwar peak of 8.2 per cent in 
1993, not counting those in labour market training programs. Unemployment stayed at 
about that level until 1998 (SCB 2005). Underlying persistent unemployment was weak 
economic growth. The GDP declined from 1991 to 1993. Together, this created a growing 
budget deficit, going from a surplus in 1990 to a large deficit only few years later (Kuhn-
le 2000; Lindvall 2004). 
 
It is beyond the scoop of this paper to explain why those macroeconomic changes 
occurred. This has been done by others (Lindvall 2004; Martin 2000). Here, I take the cri-
sis in itself as a given and focus on the impact this situation had on policymaking.  
 
A consequence of the 1990s development was that the prerequisites of the Swed-
ish welfare model – low unemployment and stable economic growth – could no longer 
be met (Huber & Stephens 1998; Pontusson 1992). Relative social spending rose as a re-
sult of both the shrinking GDP and the rising costs for unemployment. Supporting the 
growing budget deficit with loans created pressure for budget cuts on the government 
from the financial markets that set the cost of borrowing. All of this put a strain on 
Swedish social and economic policy. Politics in Sweden in the early 1990s was very 
much about dealing with these problems. 
 
One particular feature of the crisis that is of special importance is understanding 
the actions taken by the political parties and the central bank – the Riksbank – in 1992. 
This is the status of the hard currency policy adopted in the early 1990s. The Swedish 
economy was overheating in the late 1980s, and as a consequence inflation was high 
(Martin 2000). In October, 1990, the Social Democratic government changed the chief ob-
jective of Swedish macroeconomic policy, making low inflation its primary goal (prop.   12
1990/91:50). There was, early in this decade, consensus among politicians and economic 
experts that this policy should be supported by a strong commitment to a fixed exchange 
rate of the Swedish krona. In May 1991 the Riksbank pegged the krona to the European 
Currency Unit, the ECU. Unemployment could no longer be fought by devaluations, as 
had been the case in the early 1980s (Lindvall 2004). 
 
The commitment to the fixed exchange rate was, however, challenged by specu-
lation against the Swedish currency. The early 1990s was a turbulent period on the Euro-
pean exchange markets. Speculation forced several countries connected to the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) to opt out. This turbu-
lence also affected Sweden and the Riksbank defended the Swedish currency by raising 
interest rates. In September 1992 the pressure against the krona was hard. Interest rates 
were raised, at first to 24 percent, then to 75 percent, and eventually, pressured by the 
floating of other European currencies, to an inconceivable 500 percent. In November 19, 
1992, however, the Riksbank had to give up, letting the krona float (Lindvall 2004). 
 
Before that, late in August 1992, there were initiatives from both the center-right 
government and the social democratic opposition to start a dialogue, negotiating fiscal 
policy changes intended to strengthen confidence in the Swedish economy, and especial-
ly in its currency. Some contacts were made in September, and on September 17 the 
Prime Minister, Carl Bildt, from the Conservative Party, and the Social Democratic 
leader Ingvar Carlsson publicly declared that they would start a dialogue aimed at de-
veloping a crisis package. Just four days later a retrenchment package was presented, 
including cuts and increased taxes of about 40 billion SEK (DN 1992a; Egardt 1992; Prop. 
1992/93:50; Teorell 1998). 
 
Blame-avoidance and credit-claiming 
 
To understand the motives for the actions of all political parties in September 
1992 it is of the uttermost importance to understand that the main objective was to stick 
to the hard currency policy. As already mentioned, there was a strong consensus on this 
policy. The center-right government, the Social Democrats, the Riksbank and basically 
all other important actors believed that there was no laternative to floating the krona, 
mainly because of the experience of the failure of the third way (Martin 2000). However, 
speculation against the krona created hard pressure to float the Swedish currency. The 
Riksbank used the interest rate to oppose that. The 500 percent interest rate, imple-
mented the days before the first crisis package, shows just how strong this commitment 
was. At this time, it was clear that only using the interest rate would not be enough. 
Confidence in the Swedish economy as a whole had to be restored, using political 
means. This created pressure to come to an agreement on a crisis-package in the first 
place (Lindvall 2004). 
 
The broad agreement on the two crisis-packages in September 1992 is in itself 
consistent with the New Politics conception of blame avoidance. It might be interpreted 
as a way of spreading blame among the political parties and avoiding accountability in a 
time of crisis. There is also some evidence to support this. The Liberal Party leader Bengt 
Westerberg explains that one important motive for involving the Social Democrats in the 
retrenchment process was that this would share the political burden across a broader   13
majority of the political parties. “If the government itself would have presented, for 
example, a reduction of pensions to 98 percent, the critique would have been so hard, it 
would have been politically impossible to proceed”1 
 
This conclusion was, however, not shared by the government as a whole. Repre-
sentatives from the Conservative Party and from the Christian Democratic Party were 
skeptical of an agreement with the Social Democrats. Olle Wästberg, State secretary from 
the Liberal Party in the Ministry of Finance explains how the different parties in the gov-
ernment reasoned on this issue: “The Conservatives and the Christian Democrats were 
not so interested in this,” he continues; “the Liberal Party thought that it was hard for us 
[i.e., Liberals] to make big social cuts with a conservative party, and it would be much 
easier if the Social Democrats were in on this.”2 However, even within the Liberal Party, 
there were differing views on this issue. The Minister for Finance from the Liberal Party 
Anne Wibble was “not enthusiastic,” Mr. Wästberg says.3  
 
It is also the case that at least parts of the government also considered a solution 
that would not include the Social Democrats. Peter Egardt, from the Conservatives, State 
secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office and a very important advisor to the Prime 
Minister, stated in an interview to Dagens Nyheter in the beginning of September that the 
government had no intention of negotiating with the Social Democrats (Dagens Nyheter 
1992c). And even when pre-negotiations with the Social Democrats had started, the 
negotiators Carl B. Hamilton and Olle Wästberg, who were both from the Liberal Party, 
did for a long time not believe that it was worth its political price to reach an agreement 
with the Social Democrats (Hamilton 1992b; Wästberg 1992a). 
 
To understand why the government reached an agreement with the Social De-
mocrats, one must consider the alternatives. The center-right government was a minor-
ity government. It had to seek support, and it had only two options; the Social Democ-
rats or the populist party New Democracy. The Liberals, and especially Mr. Westerberg, 
had invested heavily in not relying on New Democracy because of its populist immi-
grant policies. A formalized agreement with the Populists was therefore out of the ques-
tion. This was however nothing new and Mr. Egardt explains how the government rea-
soned when they first came into office 1991: “We assumed that we, in the Riksdag, al-
ways could count on support from New Democracy,” but concludes that “at least to 
some part, that assumption proved to be wrong.”4 The Populists were, however, the 
only reasonable alternative for the government, and probably what opponents to an 
agreement with the Social Democrats were thinking of. The questions they faced were if 
they could trust New Democracy, and even if they could, would such a crisis package 
                                                 
1”Hade bara regeringen gått ut och sagt att man t.ex. skulle sänka pensionsutbetalningarna till 98 
procent, så hade kritiken blivit så hård att det hade varit politiskt omöjligt att fortsätta.” Inter-
view with Bengt Westerberg. 
2”Moderaterna och kristdemokraterna var föga intresserade av detta.” And, ”Folkpartiet menade 
att vi har mycket svårt att genomföra stora sociala nedskärningar tillsammans med ett konser-
vativt parti och det skulle underlätta oerhört om vi hade med socialdemokraterna.” Interview 
with Olle Wästberg. 
3”kände ingen entusiasm för det.” Interview with Olle Wästberg. 
4”Vi hade utgått från att vi i princip alltid kunde räkna med stöd i Riksdagen från Ny demokrati. 
Det visade sig delvis vara en felbedömning.” Interview with Peter Egardt.   14
restore the necessary confidence in the Swedish currency. Uncertainty about the answers 
to both those questions made the populist alternative less attractive. Mr. Egardt con-
cludes that “it was not a realistic alternative.”5 When the government faced the immedi-
ate currency crisis and the 500 percent interest rate was implemented, they therefore had 
only one realistic alternative if they wanted to bring a retrenchment package to parlia-
ment. 
 
What motivated the Social Democrats to make an agreement on welfare cuts with 
a center-right government is hard to explain with a blame avoidance approach. Obvi-
ously, they took a considerable political risk in doing so. They could have, after all, just 
let the government take the blame. To understand why they made an agreement one 
must recall the depth of the economic crisis and the hard currency policy. The Social De-
mocratic leader Ingvar Carlsson says that “it was an extraordinary situation. It trembled 
in a way that is not common in Sweden.”6 In his memoirs Mr. Carlsson writes about 
their motives. He points to the three arguments important to the Social Democrats: they 
worried about how Sweden would look when the Social Democrats once again came 
into office if they did not solve the crisis in a “reasonable” way; they were concerned 
about where they could seek support once in office, if they denied their own support 
now; and, they worried about the public reactions if the crisis was not solved as efficient 
as possible (Carlsson 2003, 486-487). In a memorandum from one of the government’s 
negotiators sent to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Finance, Mr. Wästberg wrote 
about how he interpreted the Social Democrats motives. In his view they had three mo-
tives: to prove that Sweden cannot be governed without the Social Democrats; to end the 
government’s reform agenda; and, according to Mr. Wästberg the Social Democrats also 
suffered from being left out of the loop [“kanslihusabstinens”] (Wästberg 1992a). What 
both descriptions have in common is that the Social Democrats were more motivated 
more by credit-claiming then blame avoidance. They wanted to be able to point to the 
agreement and to win something, as much in the eyes of the other parties as in the eyes 
of the public. 
 
To evaluate the extent to which the agreement had to do with blame avoidance, 
one might also consider how the government acted later in the mandate period. In order 
to deal with the budget deficit, welfare cuts were also made after the agreement was 
struck between the government and the Social Democrats. The most important changes 
were the cuts made in replacement rates in parental insurance and in unemployment in-
surance. Both were decreased from 90 to 80 percent (Palme & Wennemo 1998). In neither 
of those cases did the government hide who had been responsible for the cuts, and the 
bills were carried through parliament on shifting majorities. 
 
One should also consider how the Swedish parties acted before the election of 
1994. At this point, it was clear that Sweden faced new welfare cuts. The parties, how-
ever, did not try to conceal this fact, nor did they seek broad compromises. Instead, both 
the Social Democrats and other parties proposed big cuts already in their election cam-
                                                 
5“…det var inget realistiskt alternativ.” Interview with Peter Egardt. 
6“det var en väldigt speciell situation. Det skakade till på ett sätt som inte är vanligt i Sverige.” In-
terview with Ingvar Carlsson.   15
paigns. In 1994 the Social Democrats won the election on a very straightforward plat-
form of welfare cuts (SAP 1994). 
 
Summing up, it is not clear how important the blame-avoidance tactic was in the 
Swedish case. It is, however, safe to say that the most important objective for the govern-
ment was to present a credible package that could restore confidence in the national cur-
rency, and in doing so they had no real alternatives. For one party – the Liberals – the 
blame-avoidance tactic seems to have mattered, but not for other parties. Considering 
the alternatives, the Social Democratic motives, and how the parties acted later in the 
period it is probable that blame avoidance tactic not the most important – and definitely 
not the only – guiding feature. 
 
Voters and interest groups 
 
According to a basic New Politics argument, retrenchment is restricted by the un-
popularity of welfare cuts among voters. It was true, also in the early 1990s in Sweden, 
that the welfare state was supported by a large proportion of the electorate (Svallfors 
1996). If, and in such a case how, this restricted the welfare cuts is however a more open 
question. 
 
All political actors involved in the process were aware of the unpopularity of 
welfare cuts. Jan O. Karlsson, economic advisor and negotiator for the Social Democrats, 
said that: “There were a lot of discussions concerning how different groups would react, 
and how one could get people to respect the decisions. However, what really mattered 
was that there was nothing we were more afraid of than not getting results.”7 According 
to him the unpopularity among voters was not what really mattered at the end of the 
day. The Liberal leader Mr. Westerberg gives an explanation to this when he stress the 
awareness of the crisis throughout the society. “There was broad public support for the 
crisis-packages,” he says. Mr. Karlsson thinks likewise, and concludes, “the fact that the 
interest rate was 500 percent for a few days, and the popular cooperation between the 
two blocks, made the process run rather smoothly.”8 This gave politicians relatively free 
hands. 
 
What the actors referred to was more than just a feeling. A few days after the first 
crisis package, opinion polls were published in the Swedish newspapers. Public support 
for the crisis package was very strong. According to one poll 75 percent of the respon-
dents said that the agreement was “good.” Among supporters of the political parties 
backing the package support was even stronger, between 86 and 90 percent (Expressen 
1992). Another poll, published in another paper a few days later, confirmed this pattern 
(Dagens Industri 1992). 
                                                 
7”Det var väldigt mycket diskussioner om hur olika grupper skulle uppfatta det här, och hur man 
skulle få människor att respektera besluten. Men det som var styrande var att det fanns ingenting 
som vi var så rädda för som att inte nå något resultat.” Interview with Jan O. Karlsson. 
8”Det fanns en bred folklig uppbackning av krisuppgörelserna”, interview with Bengt 
Westerberg. ”förhållandet att räntan var 500 procent under några dygn samt det block-
överskridande samarbetet som medborgarna älskade gjorde att arbetet gick ganska smidigt.” 
Interview with Jan O. Karlsson.   16
It is not possible for me to evaluate these attitudes in themselves, but it is clear 
that they influenced the decision-makers. The Social Democratic leader Mr. Carlsson 
points to this fact. “We were ‘helped’ by the crisis itself. When opinion polls were taken 
right after the crisis-packages, about 85 or 90 percent backed the agreements. In this way 
it was unusually ‘easy’ to make these decisions.”9 Mr. Westerberg also concludes that 
the general “public support” for the crisis package made it easier for politicians to take 
action.10 When the government and the opposition agreed to make big cuts in the bud-
get, they relied on this side of the public opinion, and they were therefore not as con-
strained by welfare state support as one would have predicted. 
 
We now turn to the question of interest group support. In order to evaluate the 
role of interest groups, we need to establish what groups were targeted. The main wel-
fare cuts agreed to in the first crisis package were applied to sickness and work-accident 
insurance (introducing one waiting day in sickness insurance and reducing replacement 
rates to 80 percent for most of the first year and after that to 70 percent), in the pension 
system (reducing basic pension rates to 98 percent of the base amount and raising the 
pension age by one year), housing policy (reducing state subsidies), and family policy 
(abolishing a raise in the child allowance). Tax increases were also agreed to (mostly for 
medium- and high-income groups). What is more, a state commission was set up to in-
vestigate the possibility of large changes in the structure of sickness and work-accident 
insurance, transferring them to the labor market parties (Egardt 1992; Prop. 1992/93:50). 
 
The government and the Social Democrats also made some additional agree-
ments in the crisis-package. They were the result of a set of Social Democratic condi-
tions, some of them spelled out already during pre-negotiations. The center-right gov-
ernment agreed to a temporary stop to privatization, to consulting the Social Democrats 
before making any changes in labor market legislation and to a weaker kind of consul-
tation before privatizing any more state owned companies.11 Exactly what the consulta-
tion clauses meant is politically controversial, but Mr. Egardt says that from the govern-
ment point of view it was clear that the Social Democrats did not have a veto in either of 
the two cases.12 In addition, the government agreed not to increase individual contribu-
tions to unemployment insurance, which they previously declared that they would do 
(Egardt 1992).  
 
As seen from the description above, many groups were hit by the cuts: the long-
term sick, workers, pensioners, families and high-income earners. The political actors 
agreed at an early stage that “everybody” would have to pay for the economic crisis. 
“We thought that everybody should carry the burden in some way,” Mr. Westerberg 
says, and continues: “The premise of the line of argument was that we were in a kind of 
                                                 
9”Vi hade en väldig ’hjälp’ av krisläget. När det gjordes opinionsundersökningar direkt efter 
krisuppgörelserna så var det 85, 90 procent som stod bakom uppgörelserna. På det sättet var det 
ovanligt ’lätt’ att ta sådana här beslut.” Interview with Ingvar Carlsson. 
10”folklig uppbackning.” Interview with Bengt Westerberg. 
11The stronger form of consultation was in Swedish called “samråd i förtroendefull anda,” while 
the weaker was called “samråd” (Egardt 1992, 3). 
12”Frågan var om socialdemokraterna hade skaffat sig vetorätt, och det hade de inte.” Interview 
with Peter Egardt.   17
crisis that no one had seen in modern times. We were convinced that it was important to 
save the krona because it would otherwise be impossible to rid inflation from the sys-
tem, which was the precondition for the negotiations and the crisis-package. In this situ-
ation it was reasonable that everybody should pay.”13 Mr. Carlsson shared this view, 
claiming that: “The basic line was that everybody should contribute.”14 This was also ex-
pressed in the government bill that was based on the two crisis-packages and that was 
sent to parliament. The Minister for Finance, Ms. Wibble, wrote: “The reconstruction 
means that the temporary burdens will be carried by everybody, which guarantees pol-
icy support and credibility” (Prop. 1992/93:50, 8).15 
 
Even though a broad set of groups was targeted, “everybody” is never included. 
Here, there were two major exceptions. 
 
The first related to the labor market. It is true that cuts were introduced in work-
accident insurance, but aside from that, cuts in labor market policies were excluded from 
the agreement; instead, there was an expansion in active labor market policy. This ex-
pansion was, however, uncontroversial. In a memo from the first talks, Mr. Hamilton, 
negotiator for the government and advisor to the Minister for Finance, wrote “we largely 
agreed on the importance of labor market measures” (Hamilton 1992b).16 This consensus 
was a consequence of the rapidly rising unemployment. 
 
Another exception made in the labor market policy area was to unemployment 
insurance. Here the Social Democrats had blocked a rise in individual contributions, this 
was however a smaller thing, however. More important was that the unemployment in-
surance was not reduced at this point in time, but later. Reimbursement rate were at first 
reduced to 80 percent by the center-right government in 1993 (Proposition 1992/93:150), 
and then to 75 percent by the new social democratic government in 1995 (Proposition 
1994/95:150). This reflects that it had been politically possible to do it. Accordingly, why 
not in the crisis packages of 1992? 
 
To explain this we need to realize that even though there existed a consensus 
around active labor market policy, labor market policy as a whole was indeed controver-
sial. The government and the Social Democrats held very different views on labor mar-
ket legislation, and on the kind of role the trade unions should have in the administra-
tion of unemployment insurance. Actors from all parties therefore viewed this policy-
area as a political minefield, especially due to earlier declarations by the center-right 
government that it intended to change labor market legislations, and also introduce a 
compulsory clause in the unemployment insurance which would take away an impor-
                                                 
13”Vi tänkte att alla skulle vara med att bära bördorna på något sätt.” And, ”Resonemanget byg-
gde på att vi befann oss i en ekonomisk kris av ett slag som ingen hade upplevt i modern tid. Det 
fanns en övertygelse om att det var viktigt att rädda kronan, vilket var förutsättningen för för-
handlingarna och krisuppgörelsen, eftersom det annars inte skulle vara möjligt att få ut infla-
tionen ur systemet. Då var det rimligt att alla skulle få vara med och betala.” Interview with 
Bengt Westerberg. 
14”Grundinställningen var att alla skulle hjälpa till.” Interview with Ingvar Carlsson. 
15”Saneringen innebär att den temporära börda besparingarna utgör kommer att bäras av alla, 
vilket garanterar uppslutningen och trovärdigheten kring politiken.” 
16”vi nog i stort sett var överens om vikten om arb. mark. pol. Åtgärder.”   18
tant motive for joining trade unions. The center-right government later introduced such  
a compulsory clause, in 1994, just before the election. The Social Democratic government 
eliminated it upon coming to power the same year (SOU 1996:150). 
 
It was not, however, an overall demand of the Social Democrats to exclude all 
labor market policies, thereby ruling out cuts in unemployment insurance. Social De-
mocratic demands before the negotiations were clearly defined in a set of memoranda 
from the Ministry of Finance (inträdesbiljetterna). It consisted of four types of demands: 
1) information about the economic situation and the state budget; 2) a reform-stop, and 
especially not to enact the care allowance reform (introducing special assistance to par-
ents whose children did not use public child care); 3) no tax cuts that were not specifi-
cally financed; 4) and a halt to the privatization of state corporations (Hamilton 1992a, 
1992b, 1992c; Wästberg 1992a). 
 
Labor market policy was not mentioned in these memos, with the exception of 
the common position on active the labor market policy cited above. It became, rather, a 
common understanding among the actors involved that it would be too hard to agree, 
making it hard to even discuss this area. Mr. Egardt explains that the government 
realized that “there were certain issues of special importance for the Social Democrats 
that would be unjustified to bring up, because of the trouble it would lead to”.17 
Therefore, the government did not force these issues. The Social Democratic negotiator 
Mr. Karlsson said that “We were rather pragmatic; we only talked about things where 
we could get results”. He continued: “If we had had ‘peace’ concerning the structure of 
the system, then we would probably have been able to make some cuts in 
unemployment insurance and taken some complaints from Norra Bantorget.”18 (Norra 
Bantorget is the address of Landsorganisationen i Sverige, LO, the blue collar confedera-
tion which is linked to the Social Democratic Party.) 
 
The last comment, and the fact that both the center-right government and the 
Social Democrats cut reimbursement rates in unemployment insurance shows that this 
might have been possible. It is plausible that this was influenced by the trade unions. 
However, when asked about contacts with interest organizations, all decision makers 
stated that there had been no time for such contacts. Normally, in Sweden, all govern-
mental proposals are referred for consideration to major organizations. Now, they found 
themselves excluded from the process, with one exception, due to the organization of 
the Swedish Social Democratic Party. In their Executive Committee (Verkställande 
utskott) LO was represented, and as far as the executive committee was involved, so was 
LO (for a description of the decision-making process, see Teorell 1998). However, I find 
no evidence from the interviews that LO was an important actor during the negotiations. 
And, the contention that it was not is supported by the fact that after the second crisis-
package, the Chairman of the LO, Stig Malm, was openly critical of the agreement 
(Dagens Nyheter 1992b). 
                                                 
17“det finns hjärtefrågor för socialdemokraterna som det är ohemult för oss att föra fram, vi inser 
vilka problem det skulle leda till.” Interview with Peter Egardt. 
18”Vi var väldigt pragmatiska,” ”vi talade bara om saker där vi visste att vi kunde nå resultat,” 
and ” Om vi hade haft borgfred om systemets struktur så hade man nog kunnat göra besparingar 
på A-kassesystemet, och tagit lite gny från Norra Bantorget.” Interview with Jan O. Karlsson.    19
The other major exception that demonstrates that “everybody” was not included 
involved the so-called handicap-reform. This was an extensive reform act from the Min-
istry of Health and Social Affairs, to which the Minister for Social Affairs himself was 
very dedicated. It aimed to improve the standard of living for the disabled, introducing 
personal assistance. It was an expensive reform and it is easy to imagine that it could 
have been abandoned in the retrenchment process. What is more, prior to the agreement 
the Social Democrats set the precondition that there should be no more reforms, how-
ever, this demand was after a while presented as “a general rule with one exception (the 
handicap-reform)” (Hamilton 1992c).19 
 
The personal commitment of the Minister for Social Affairs and Liberal Party 
leader, Mr. Westerberg, played an important role as to the fate of the handicap reform. 
Mr. Westerberg, stated: “I was very concerned to implement the handicap-reform that I 
worked on at that time, irrespective of the cuts.”20 He was in a position to save it because 
of his strong position in the government and because of his importance in the negotia-
tions with the Social Democrats. “Bengt was crystal clear on this matter. It was not seen 
as negotiable. The Liberal Party, or at least Bengt Westerberg, could have left the govern-
ment on this matter,” Mr. Hamilton said.21 The Minister for Health and Social Insurance 
Bo Könberg concluded on this matter that, “if it would not have been for Bengt [Wester-
berg] the reform would not have survived.”22 This makes it understandable as to why it 
was approved in the government. And Mr. Karlsson explains why the Social Democrats 
accepted this: “It had to do with Bengt Westerberg’s crucial role in the negotiations. 
There was a mutual understanding between Bengt Westerberg and Ingvar Carlsson. Ing-
var did not object that his most important counterpart put the handicap-reform aside.”23 
The handicap reform seems to a considerably large extent to have survived due to the 
personal commitment of Mr. Westerberg. More crucial in this case, however, was that no 
one pointed to the handicap movement as an important actor. 
 
In sum, voter support for the welfare state did not halt the retrenchment process. 
It is clear that all politicians involved were concerned with how welfare cuts would be 
received, but they were at the same time convinced, correctly or incorrectly, that the cri-
sis itself would help them overcome this obstacle. There was a good chance that citizens 
would agree that there was no way around this, as the decision makers thought, and 
opinion polls at the time of the crisis packages seem to have proved them right. 
 
The welfare cuts struck broadly. All actors agreed that no social group should be 
left out of this. Contrary to what has been claimed about the Swedish case, even strong 
interest groups were not able to oppose the cuts by pressuring the political actors. Ex-
                                                 
19”En generell regel med ett undantag (handikappreformen),” Hamilton 1992c. 
20”Jag var angelägen om att genomföra handikappreformen, som jag arbetade med, oavsett 
besparingarna.” Interview with Bengt Westerberg. 
21”Bengt var kristallklar på den punkten. Det uppfattades som att det inte var förhandlingsbart. 
Folkpartiet, eller åtminstone Bengt Westerberg, skulle nästan kunna lämna regeringen på den 
frågan.” Interview with Carl B. Hamilton. 
22”hade inte Bengt varit så hade inte reformen överlevt.” Interview with Bo Könberg. 
23”Det hade att göra med Bengt Westerbergs helt avgörande roll i förhandlingarna. Det fanns 
ömsesidig förståelse mellan Bengt Westerberg och Ingvar Carlsson. Ingvar hade ingenting emot 
att hans viktigaste motpart fick föra undan handikappreformen.” Interview with Jan O. Karlsson.   20
ceptions were made, for broader political reasons (unemployment insurance) and be-
cause of personal commitments (the handicap-reform). The exception of unemployment 
insurance and the Social Democratic conditions in the agreement show that partisan 
politics had an important impact in this process. It would be unwise to claim something 
else. Because of the ideological differences on the larger issue of labor market policy 
structure, cuts in unemployment insurance were ruled out, something that did not have 
to happen. This however still does not explain the broad structure of the cuts in 1992, or 
that unemployment insurance could be cut later both by the center-right government 
and the Social Democrats. Partisan politics is clearly important in retrenchment pro-
cesses but the link to interest groups is neither as direct nor as strong as suggested 
earlier (Anderson 2001, Timonen 2003). 
 
Setting the menu 
 
Once again it is important to remember currency speculations and the status of 
the hard currency policy at this time. The hard currency policy gave the political actors a 
common objective. All political actors involved in the crisis-packages tried to defend the 
krona, using one instrument that was not available to the Riksbank; fiscal policy 
changes. Prime Minister Carl Bildt and the Social Democratic leader Ingvar Carlsson 
spelled out this objective in a common statement before the agreement on 17 September 
1992. “The government and the Social Democrats have initiated a dialog, aiming at an 
agreement on a crisis-package to make it possible, also in the long run, to defend the 
Swedish krona and strengthen the Swedish economy” (quoted in Dennis 1998, 57).24 
 
How to “strengthen the Swedish economy” was, however, to a large extent influ-
enced by the Riksbank. One day after the Bildt-Carlsson statement, on the afternoon of 
September 18, Bengt Dennis, Governor of the Riksbank, presented the Bank’s analysis to 
an assembly of the leaders of all parties represented in the Riksdag. He presented a list 
of eight points, with the Bank’s view on what should result from a crisis package. Most 
of the points were general, some practical advice, but some others were clearly policy re-
commendations. Dennis’s third point was the most obvious example: “The range of cuts 
in the budget, and possible increases in income, must together reach three percent of the 
GDP. The greater part should to be budget cuts” (Dennis 1998, 62).25 
 
This policy recommendation – big cuts, small tax increases – influenced the po-
litical actors and dominated negotiations the following weekend. Both the Minister for 
Taxation and Financial Markets, Bo Lundgren, of the Conservative Party, and the Minis-
ter for Finance, Ms. Wibble, of the Liberal Party, have described how important this talk 
was (Lundgren 1998, 150; Wibble 1994, 28). Other actors agree that the analysis from the 
Riksbank was crucial. Mr. Westerberg described in an interview how the 3 percent of 
                                                 
24”Samtal förs nu mellan regeringen och socialdemokraterna syftande till en krisuppgörelse för 
att göra det möjligt att också långsiktigt värna den svenska kronans värde och stärka den svenska 
ekonomin.” 
25“Omfattningen av utgiftsneddragningar och eventuella inkomstförstärkningar måste sam-
mantaget uppgå till vad som minst motsvarar tre procent av BNP. Helt övervägande delen bör 
vara nedskärningar av utgifterna.” (Dennis 1998, 62).   21
GDP figure set the framework in the negotiations: “We were aiming at cuts of about 50 
billion in the negotiations.”26 
 
By setting the framework, the Riksbank’s way of thinking affected the substance 
in the crisis package. Mr. Westerberg continue: “The analysis was not so much about the 
effects this might have on individuals, even if this was a restriction, but more about 
reaching large budget cuts.”27 The Social Democratic leader Mr. Carlsson holds a similar 
view regarding what was important during the negotiations. He says: “At this point it 
was most important to do what was right from an economic point of view, and that had 
an effect on the budget. It was all about lowering the interest rate.”28 
 
In his study of the Swedish crisis of the 1990s Anders Lindbom paraphrases Gös-
ta Esping-Anderson (1990). Lindbom writes: “it is difficult to imagine that anyone has 
struggled to make painful cutbacks per se” (Lindbom 2001, 173). But this is more or less 
what they did. All political actors had one thing in common; they struggled for big cuts 
per se. This defined the first crisis package, and it is important to note that the process, 
already at its outset, was to a large extent influenced by key officials at the Riksbank, 
and especially by its governor Mr. Dennis. 
 
Why did the Riksbank try to influence the negotiations? The general answer to 
this is that it was the only way it could fulfil its role in the state structure. Its key objec-
tive was to defend the Swedish currency, something they thought was necessary at the 
time, and using the interest rate was not efficient enough. From the bank’s perspective 
the importance of the crisis-package would be demonstrated by how it was judged by 
the financial markets. The Bank’s analysis at the time of the first crisis-package showed 
that the budget deficit was the biggest problem, and what was especially worrying was 
a large “structural” part of the budget deficit. Only large cuts could deal with this. Ac-
cording to the Governor, Mr. Dennis, this analysis was based on their studies, but also 
influenced by recommendations from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Dennis 
1998, 64-65). The Riksbank was convinced that most actors in the financial markets 
shared their view of the nature of the problem, and without credibility on those markets, 
the Riksbank’s task would be impossible. 
 
The reason for the broad influence of their analysis was the political indepen-
dence of the Riksbank. Formally the Riksbank became independent first in 1999, but it 
had been so, de facto, already in the early 1990s (Lindvall 2004, 122). If their recommen-
dations had been interpreted as influenced by partisan politics, the Social Democrats 
would probably not have been as convinced by their advice, and it is plausible that they 
would have fought for more tax increases and fewer cuts, in the negotiations. Now, the 
mix suggested by the Riksbank was, more or less, taken for granted. 
                                                 
26”Vi satt i förhandlingarna och skulle komma upp i ett besparingsprogram på ungefär 50 mil-
jarder.” Interview with Bengt Westerberg.  
27“Då handlade inte analysen om att titta exakt på vilka effekter som olika förslag hade för en-
skilda individer, även om detta fanns med som en restriktion, utan det handlade om att uppnå 
mycket stora besparingar på budgeten.” Interview with Bengt Westerberg. 
28“I det här läget var det viktiga att göra det som var ekonomiskt riktigt och som hade effekt på 
budgeten. Det handlade om att få ner räntan.” Interview with Ingvar Carlsson.   22
The Riksbank’s independence did not, however, mean that it could not be used 
for political purposes by other actors. The Prime Minister’s State Secretary Mr. Egardt 
says that he and Mr. Bildt were informed of the Riksbank’s analysis through the Minister 
for Finance, Ms. Wibble. The three of them wanted to convince other actors, both within 
and outside of the government, that big cuts were necessary. Especially, they wanted to 
influence the Minister for Social Affairs Bengt Westerberg and the Social Democrats. Ac-
cording to Mr. Egardt this was the reason for which the Prime Minister invited Mr. Den-
nis to present the Riksbank’s view to the party leaders. Mr. Egardt even says that the 
idea of defining the magnitude of the cuts in per cent of GDP came from Mr. Bildt, Ms. 
Wibble and himself. “You can not command Bengt Dennis, but I said that it was im-
portant also to define the goal as percent of GDP, so we attained a frame within which we 
could work.”29 Mr. Egardt stated that this had achieved the effect “that they had hoped 
for.”30 Although there is no evidence suggesting that the Riksbank itself had had a politi-
cal agenda, the circumstances made it a useful tool in the hands of those who did.  
 
After the Bildt-Carlsson statement and the. Dennis lecture, on Thursday and Fri-
day, when substantial negotiations had started, it became clear that the parties needed a 
quick result. An agreement had to be presented by the following Monday at the latest. 
“We knew that failure would be a setback for all parties, as for Sweden,” wrote the Min-
ister for Finance Anne Wibble, in her memoirs (Wibble 1994, 30).31 
 
Before this there had been a dialogue for little over two weeks, mainly among 
two of Anne Wibble’s advisors – Olle Wästberg and Carl B. Hamilton – and two social 
democratic economic advisors – Jan O. Karlsson and Leif Pagrotsky, but also with some 
influence from the Prime Minister’s State Secretary Peter Egardt. These talks were aimed 
at preparing the ground for more substantial negotiations, but for some time, it was un-
certain if they would ever lead to high-level negotiations. When the pre-negotiations 
started, at the beginning of September 1992, the government’s negotiators did not be-
lieve in a deal with the Social Democrats (Hamilton 1992b, Wästberg 1992a). Although 
important, these talks did not, for the most part, deal with real policy issues. Their im-
portance lay elsewhere, Mr. Wästberg stated: “Its most important role was to create 
trust.”32 
 
Under these circumstances, almost all decisions concerning substantial budget 
cuts had to be made during the high-level negotiations during the weekend of Septem-
ber 18-20. The politicians, therefore, were forced to work with what they already had, 
and this consisted mainly of lists of suggestions from the Ministry of Finance. Due to 
this, officials at the Ministry of Finance and their colleagues at the other ministries in-
volved – in this case mainly the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Health and 
Social Affairs – played a very important role for the substantial budget cuts. 
                                                 
29”Bengt Dennis styr man inte, men jag sa att det var viktigt att han också angav procent av BNP 
som mål, så att vi därmed kunde få ett ramverk att arbeta inom.” Interview with Peter Egardt. 
30”På det sätt som vi hade hoppas på.” Interview with Peter Egardt. 
31”Vi visste att ett misslyckande vore ett nederlag för alla inblandade, liksom för Sverige.” 
32”Dess viktigaste roll var att det var ett slags förtroendeskapande verksamhet.” Interview with 
Olle Wästberg.   23
The significance political actors attached to the advice from key officials were re-
flected in the demands made by the Social Democrats during pre-negotiations. As al-
ready mentioned, they wanted guaranties against new reforms, tax cuts and privatiza-
tions, but they also demanded “economic analysis (made by Ingemar Hansson)” (Hamil-
ton 1992b).33 Ingemar Hansson was the Director-General of the Ministry of Finance’s 
Economic Affairs Department. The Social Democrats obviously not only trusted him, but 
also thought that they needed the information he could provide to enable the agreement. 
 
How important state officials were also is reflected by accusations of lack of sug-
gestions, made both by the government and the Social Democrats. “The Social Democ-
rats had very few suggestions,” said the Minister for Health and Social Insurance, Bo 
Könberg; and the Social Democratic leader Mr Carlsson stated “the government, 
strangely enough, was badly prepared.”34 Once the negotiations had started, were no 
state officials involved; politicians seem to have had a very hard time coming up with 
new suggestions. 
 
So, where did they get their suggestions? As a normal part of their job, officials at 
the Ministry of Finance prepared lists of possible reforms to strengthen the budget, espe-
cially during times of budget deficit. “These are a kind of suggestion that are often pre-
pared at the Ministry of Finance, and then discussed with, for example, the Ministry of 
Health and Social Affairs,” says Kristina Reinholdsson who, at that time, worked as a co-
ordinator between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. 
Bettina Kashefi, who had a similar position, confirmed this, saying: “the suggestions 
came partly from the Ministry of Finance, partly from the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs.”35 
 
Mr. Hansson explained the special importance of the Ministry of Finance: “Offi-
cials at the Ministry of Finance always make long lists of budget cuts. To a large extent 
measures from those lists were used.” He continued: “There is no ‘expenditure ministry’ 
that wants to suggest cuts in its own field, and the Prime Minister’s office and the offices 
of the political parties lack the competence to come up with suggestions that are possible 
to implement.”36 There are two departments within the Ministry of Finance that make 
these kinds of lists: Mr. Hanson’s Economic Affairs Department and the Budget Depart-
ment. Documents reveal that during the autumn 1992 Mr. Hansson and Inga-Britt Ah-
lenius, Director-General, Ministry of Finance’s Budget Department, and their colleagues, 
                                                 
33”rent ekonomiska, klara kalkyler (gjorda av Ingemar Hansson).” (Hamilton 1992b).  
34”Socialdemokraterna hade väldigt få förslag.” Interview with Bo Könberg. ”Regeringen var 
märkligt nog väldigt oförberedda.” Interview with Ingvar Carlsson. Mr. Egardt, Mr. Hamilton, 
Mr. Karlsson and Mr. Wästberg makes simular statements in their interviews. See also Carlsson 
(2003, 493). 
35”Detta är en typ av förslag som ofta finns förberedda på Finansdepartementet och som sedan 
diskuteras med t.ex. Socialdepartementet.” Interview with Kristina Reinholdsson. “förslagen togs 
dels fram i Finansdepartementet, dels i fackdepartementen.” interview with Bettina Kashefi. 
36”Finansdepartementets tjänstemän håller alltid långa listor med potentiella åtgärder för att för-
stärka budgeten. I stora drag blev det åtgärder från de listorna.” And, ”Det finns inget utgifts-
departement som vill ta fram besparingar på sitt område och Statsrådsberedningen och partikan-
slierna saknar kompetens för att utforma förslag så att de går att implementera i praktiken.” 
Interview with Ingemar Hansson.   24
presented several memos with lists of budget cuts (Ackeby & Kashefi 1992; Ahlenius 
1992a, 1992b; Hansson 1992a, 1992b, 1992c). 
 
The list of budget cuts was then normally discussed with other officials in the dif-
ferent ministries involved. The Director-General of the Social Insurance Department of 
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, Inger Rydén Bergendahl, said: “Often, we ob-
tained long lists from the Ministry of Finance with questions on what one or the other 
measure would provide.” Ms. Rydén Bergendahl continues: “The Ministry of Finance 
has, in this process between the Government Offices, the privilege to make suggestions 
regardless of their political acceptance.”37 Bengt Sibbmark, Deputy Director at the Social 
Insurance Department, explains the different roles of the ministries in this process, as 
seen from the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs: “Lists from the Ministry of Finance 
have sometimes the character of wishful thinking regarding which cuts are possible. If 
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs got an assignment to make cuts, we wanted to 
come up with a suggestion that reasonably considered the purpose of the insurance. 
This is a source of discussion between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Health 
and Social Affairs.”38 
 
The Prime Minister’s Office was also very active. This is the most politicized of 
the Government Offices. It has a coordinating role between the coalition partners and a 
larger proportion of political advisers than the other offices do. Suggestions on budget 
cuts were normally processed at the Ministry of Finance, and then sometimes comple-
mented by ideas from the Prime Minister’s Office. The Prime Minister’s State Secretary, 
Mr. Egardt, claimed that their biggest contribution during the autumn 1992 was an idea 
of a large reform within the social insurance system known as the Stair (trappan). This 
suggestion was initiated by Mr. Egardt himself, “it was something I had prepared,” as 
he said. However, one should also note that it had similarities, and in all memoranda it 
was compared to, a suggestion from the Swedish Employers’ Association (Svenska ar-
betsgivareföreningen,  SAF) (Johansson & Olofsson 1992a, 1992b). The Stair was an at-
tempt to coordinate reimbursement rates between different social insurance systems 
(sickness, work-accident, unemployment and parental leave), and create what was called 
a stair of incitement.39 The lowest step – at a reimbursement rate of 75 percent – would 
be used for short-time leaves and the highest step – at 100 percent – would only be 
reached through a regular, full-time job. A preliminary analysis showed that this would 
result in cuts of roughly 12 billion SEK (Johansson & Olofsson 1992a). The Stair was an 
extensive reform, and it was never implemented, although some of its components such 
as waiting days, cuts in reimbursement rates and coordination between the sickness and 
the work-accident insurance were used. These elements were not new, however, and if 
                                                 
37”Det kom ofta långa listor från finansdepartementet med frågor om vad den ena eller andra 
åtgärden skulle ge.” And, “Finansdepartementet har privilegiet att i dessa RK-interna processer 
hävda synpunkter oavsett om de var politiskt acceptabla eller inte.” Interview with Inger Rydén 
Bergendahl. 
38”Finansens listor har ibland haft karaktären av önsketänkande när det gäller möjliga 
besparingar. Om Socialdepartementet får ett visst besparingsbeting så vill vi lägga ett rimligt 
förslag givet försäkringarnas syfte. Detta är en källa till diskussion mellan finansen och Social-
departementet.” Interview with Bengt Sibbmark. 
39”…’trappan’ som jag hade utarbetat.” Interview with Peter Egardt.   25
this was an outflow from the Stair or derived from earlier, more moderate suggestions, 
are hard to say. 
 
There were important differences between how the three Ministries acted, but 
each was trying to fulfil its role within the state apparatus. Officials at the Ministry of 
Finance were mainly concerned with budget effects, and this was only natural. They 
proposed cuts wherever they could, but always within the existing system. Therefore, 
they were constrained by its structure. Their mandate did not to restructure the system, 
only to keep it safe. This tendency was reinforced by the way the Ministry of Health and 
Social Affairs acted. They introduced more constraints as they also considered the pur-
pose of the Swedish social insurance systems. But again, this was only natural, given its 
role within the state. This role was to protect the social policy interests in this process, 
and that is what it did. The only Ministry of the three that could think outside the box 
was the Prime Minister’s Office, and it was also from this Ministry that an idea of a large 
policy reform was introduced. The Prime Minister’s Office could do so precisely because 
it was the most politicized ministry. Key officials there had, to a larger extent, a mandate 
to propose structural changes, if they could agree on them; again it was not strange that 
they looked to their party’s ideologies for guidance, something key officials in the other 
ministries could never do. 
 
There is no doubt that the suggestions from the Ministry of Finance were the 
most important. The Minister for Finance, Ms. Wibble, described in her memoirs how 
lists from the Ministry of Finance were processed among the politicians, although her 
description regards the so-called Nathalie plan, a retrenchment plan decided on in 1993. 
“Usually we met at the Prime Minister’s office, Bengt Westerberg, Olof Johansson, Alf 
Svensson, and me. I brought long lists of possible, and impossible cuts, and income in-
creases. Everything was on the list to start with – from cuts on defense and foreign aid, 
to indirect taxation on lottery. Then we all said what was most important for us and 
what we felt should be protected, what were acceptable alternatives. Of course, there 
was at first not enough left. But after a while, some areas crystallized. And at the end, we 
could agree on a program of the right proportion” (Wibble 1994, 48).40 
 
This probably bears similarities to the process before crisis packages in 1992, but 
it also has some important differences. The most important difference was that the full 
list of potential cuts was not presented to the Social Democrats during the high-level ne-
gotiations, although Mr. Egardt says that the larger list was suggested to the Social De-
mocrats during the pre-negotiations.41 Much of the political sorting-out process was 
made within the government, and before the negotiations. What was offered from the 
                                                 
40”Vi brukade träffas på statsministerns rum, Bengt Westerberg, Carl Bildt, Olof Johansson, Alf 
Svensson och jag. Jag hade med mig långa listor över möjliga och omöjliga besparingar och 
inkomstförstärkningar. Allt stod på listan från början – allt från minskade utgifter för försvar och 
bistånd till moms på lotteri. Sedan gick vi laget runt och kryssade för hjärtefrågor som helst 
skulle fredas och alternativ som kunde accepteras. Först blev det naturligtvis alldeles för lite kvar. 
Men efter några varv till utkristalliserade sig ett antal områden. Och till slut kunde vi enas om ett 
program av önskvärd omfattning.” 
41”När vi träffade socialdemokraterna de första gångerna så fick de inte skarpa förslag från vår 
sida istället testade vi av menyer, så att säga, utan att få någon egentlig reaktion.” Interview with 
Peter Egardt.   26
government, when the high-level negotiations with the Social Democrats began was 
therefore a sample from the list.  
 
In sum, the possible choices of welfare cuts were restricted in two different ways 
during the negotiations of the first crisis package. To start with, a high level of cuts was 
set even before the very nature of these cuts was discussed. This high level forced the 
politicians to go beyond their own priorities, and this especially applies to the Social De-
mocrats and Liberal Party, although the Minister for Finance seems to have had a differ-
ent view than the party leader, Mr. Westerberg. The politicians therefore had to work 
with what was within reach, and this was suggestions from officials at the ministries, 
and mainly from the Finance Ministry. The lists of potential cuts produced there defined 
the universe of cuts on which the politicians could agree. The menu was set and the 
politicians chose from it; at the same time this restricted the policy choices and made 




This paper points to the limited explanatory power of both voter-based and 
blame-avoidance explanations. Although it is true that the unpopularity in the electorate 
of welfare cuts was well-known, and that this had been considered by all political actors, 
but this did not keep politicians from carrying the cuts through. Politicians could do so 
because they thought that the current economic crisis in Sweden would create an under-
standing for the measures taken. Therefore, they were not so afraid of the reactions of 
the electorate. Regarding the political tactics of blame-avoidance, I have argueed that 
this might have been one motive for one political actor – the Liberal Party – but it was 
certainly not what defined the process. 
 
This paper also demonstrates that existing, mostly interest-based, explanations of 
welfare cuts can not fully explain the Swedish case. The argument is not that this is the 
way politics work in Sweden, quite the contrary I claim that this was the case even in 
Sweden. Strong interest groups, both “new groups” such as pensioner organizations and 
“old groups” such as trade unions, could not oppose their constituencies who were af-
fected by welfare state retrenchment. As it was, a broad set of groups was targeted by 
welfare cuts, and the exceptions that were made had been done for reasons other than 
the organizational strength of those groups. This does not mean, however, that partisan 
politics does not matter. On the contrary this study shows that ideology has a large im-
pact. The argument presented here is rather that partisan politics is restricted by the 
party actors’ dependence on advice from key officials.  
 
This paper points to the fact that the retrenchment process, at its outset, was 
heavily influenced by the analysis of the Swedish Riksbank. Following the Bank’s analy-
sis politicians aimed at big cuts, and few or no tax increases, to strengthen the budget in 
order to regain confidence in the Swedish currency. The study suggests that this could 
have been much different. If the Social Democrats had been only guided by their ideolo-
gy, they could very well have fought for big tax increases instead of big cuts. Now, 
probably to some extent influenced by the Riksbank, they did not.  
   27
There was also little time to adopt these measures. Facing the question as to 
where cuts should be made, politicians relied heavily on advice from key officials main-
ly at the Ministry of Finance, but to some extent also at the Prime Minister’s Office and 
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. Initiated from the Ministry of Finance these of-
ficials had, as a normal part of their job, prepared long lists of possible welfare cuts. 
These were now used, and they thereby set out the framework of what was possible for 
the politicians to do. In this way, as the number of options was restricted, the politicians 
to a large extent disregarded their conflicting interests and instead looked for practical 
solutions. I therefore argue that, contrary to conventional wisdom, civil servants played 
an important part in the political outcome of welfare state retrenchment in Sweden. 
 
State official advice might not always work in this way. It depends on which pa-
rameters state officials consider when giving advice. The suggestion initiated from the 
Prime Minister’s Office shows this. This is the most politicized of the Government Of-
fices in Sweden. Their most important advice was a large social insurance reform, which 
had a lot in common with an earlier suggestion from SAF. If this kind of partisan advice 
had been the only kind, the outcome would probably have been much different, and 
possibly without any agreement at all. 
 
In the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, on the 
other hand, political gains and losses were not included in the officials’ advice. Instead 
their advice was biased on keeping the system intact. These offices are not very politi-
cized. The question they tried to answer was which cuts should be made, given their 
position in the system. If they had also considered possibilities for reelection of the gov-
ernment or other political parameters, their recommendations, and thereby also the po-
litical outcome, would probably have been much different. In mature welfare states 
there is an interesting variation in the politicization of key officials, and the results exem-
plified by the Swedish case suggest that differences between countries in levels of inter-
est conflicts during retrenchment periods could be explained by variation in the politici-
zation of officials, probably linked to the basis on which they are appointed to office.   28
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